T his paper aims at presenting t he met hodol ogi cal appr oach to s i mul at i ons , proposed at the beginning of the s i x t i es by a gr oup of scholars of the Car negi e Mellon Univer s ity. I n that period, in fact, these s chol ar s started t o wor k on computer programs as a way to model human and economi cs behaviour. T his paper show the mai n featur es of such appr oach and i t s link with the gener al methodology that this research gr oup pr opos ed f or economics, based on the need of more r eal i s t i c h y pot h es i s as a way to get better explanations and pr evi s i ons of the s oci al phenomena. T here i s so, also a link between s imulations and empi r i cal analysis, that is, in fact, the poi nt of departure and t he way to t es t models.
T hese wor k s seem to have been neglected i n the f ol l owi ng devel opment of Economics (for example t he s ynt hes i s proposed by Clarkson and S i mon, 1960 , it is quoted j us t two t i mes in all article avai l abl e i n Js tor and i s never quoted i n a s peci al i z ed j our nal as Jass). T he s ame S i mon in a paper written s ome year s later, notes that, while i n nor mative microeconomics simulations have made l ar ge cont r i but i ons , in pos itive mi cr oeconomi cs , their contribution has been modes t (Simon, 1978) , especially in dealing wi t h or ganization (S imon, 2000) . I t seems yet that the wor k s under exam can be us ef ul in the act ual debate on s imulations , as many of the pr obl ems still to s ol ve has just emerged. T he s ol ut i ons proposed ar e maybe not general, as based on a beh av i ou r al and cogni t i ve appr oach, but are anyway worth of being considered.
T he di fferent typologies of simulations
T he anal ys i s starts from the paper of Herbert Simon and Geoffrey Clarkson -titled " S i mulation of I ndividual and Gr oup B ehavi our " , published i n 1960 in the Amer i can Economic R ev i ew -in which they clarify many as pects of simulations, theory and economet r i c an al y s i s , and of their reciprocal relations. In the s ame per i od, other authors published al s o paper s dealing wi t h s imulations . Most of these s chol ar s come f r om the s ame U ni ver s i t y as Simon. T he paper s were al l published i n important journals.
Clarkson and S i mon define t he f ol l owi ng t hr ee k i nds of simulation analys is . Among t he t hr ee typologies of models there ar e, as usual when dealing wi t h clas s ifications , some pos s i bl e intersections, beyond many obvious points of contact.
1.A. Dynamic m acr o econ om i c
T he mai n examples are t he model s used i n the anal y s i s of the bus i nes s cycle and mar k et behaviour. T his situations can be handl ed wi t h differ ential and di f f er ence equat i ons or with the method of comparative s t at i c. I n this realm, simulations are s een as an addi t i onal technique f or numerical analysis that can be useful because of computer speed and comput at i onal power. T hey can be us ed t o manage mor e complexity and non linear ity.
T he us e of simulations represents here a dev el opment in mathematical and economet r i c techniques and i s just a di f f er en t way to model a gi ven s ituation. I n fact, it is necessary to: (1) hypothesize a f u n ct i on al form of a f u n ct i on , (2) then it should be es t i mat ed wi t h any of the available i ns t r ument s ; (3) at this point it's necessary to def i ne all initial values necessary to t he model. Simulations will then gener ate a s er i es of observations. T heri output is, in fact, a n u mer i cal series and not a mat h emat i cal general relation. T his series of numbers can then be di r ect l y compared with r eal data. I n many cases it's possible t hat traditional econometric pr ocedu r es give bes t results. I n fact, here, a par t from s t ar ti ng val ues , all the number s of the s er i es are gener at ed by the pr ogr am and t hen the i nput variables will probably be di f f er ent from the r eal values, used i n the t r adi t i onal econometric an al y s i s . As observed by Cohen and Cyert (in Cyer t and Mar ch, 1964) , these di f f er ences reflect the f act that traditional models are " one per i od change model s " while s i mul at i ons are " pr oces s models", i.e. models characterized by an inter nal evolution. When a model contain a f eedback mechanisms, simulations could allow mor e accur at e f or ecas t i ng (an example i s the anal ys i s proposed by Cohen, 1960a ).
1.B . Normative model s developed in the management science
I n this realm the compl ex i t y of the envi r onment can be managed mor e eas ily and wi t h gr eater flexibility by s imulations than by mathematical techniques as linear programming. T he di fference wi t h the ot her two k i nds of simulations is clear, as these model s have a n or mat i v e dimension and not a pos i t i v e one. T his kind of simulations was very relevant and f r equent in the per i od under exam. Shubick (1958) states that simulations was born in this realm ( wi th military and management purposes). Also S i mon (1978) , look i ng back at the devel opment of these t echniques in economics and management, stress the r el evance of such pr ocedur es for American Bus ines s firms, in dealing wi t h their inventory, cash-holdings and i nves t ment decisions. So t he deci s i ons procedures of these organizations are much differ ent from the pr evi ous years ones 1 . T hese t echniques allow, sometimes, firms to t ak e al mos t rational decision, or, at least, to appl y more power f ul heuristics. I t's not surprising t hat the f i r s t authors to pr opos e t hi s procedure i n Economics were s chol ar s with an high tendency to i nt er di s ci pl i nar y and wi t h interest in management. T he s ame r eas on could al s o ex pl ai n the l ow i nter es t solicited among t r adi t i onal economists.
1.C. Economic deci s i on -making
Almost all economics models are bas ed on s ome deci s i on making pr oces s of an economic act or s . Also macr oeconomi c models can be r ead i n this way. A demand cur ve, for example, can be s een as a r epr es en t at i on of a s er i es of decisions. So poi nt a and c h av e many areas of intersection. When we move f r om macr o t o mi cr o model s , and f r om nor mati ve t o pos i t i ve anal ys i s , the behavioural elements became mor e r el evant .
Again the us ef ul ness of simulations is here r el at ed t o t he degr ee of complexity they allow to handle. T here i s another important aspects, according t o t he aut hor s . Computer allows, in fact, also t o build agent s that manipulate s ymbol s and i nf or mat i on, different from number s (like wor ds or sentences). T his characteristic wou l d per mi t to model situations in which the i mpor t ant factors cannot be r epr es ent ed as real numbers. Simon pr opos es two ex ampl e of the limits imposed by the need t o model all aspects with number : risk is represented wi t h pr obability distribution and ut ility is analysed wi t h a car di n al function. I mportant aspects in decis ion making, cannot be r epr es ent ed us i ng number s . Computers can be programmed t o allow a di fferent modellization.
T he nex t two par agr aph pr opos es two ex ampl e of simulations developed by the aut hor s under exam, and f alling i nt o t hi s third cat egor y. Simon-Barenfeld ( 1969) and S i mon-Gilmartin (1973) build a compu t er program to model perception and memor y of chess players.
1.C.I . T he anal ys i s and modelization of perception and memor y st or age of individual chess players
T he anal y s i s is based on a det ailed r econs t r uct i on of the r eal mechanisms working i n this situations that is useful to recall here and t o r el at e t o t he char act er i s t i cs of the s i mul at i on.
During t he f i r s t moments in which a s k illed pl ayer is faced wi t h a n ew game pos i t i on, he does not appear to engage i n a s ear ch of possible moves . I n fact, he s eems to be gat her i ng i nf or mation on the pr obl em. T his finding r es ul t s from a s er i es of empirical investigations, based on differ ent procedures, like pr ot ocol analysis and ex per i ment on per ception (de Gr oot , 1965 (de Gr oot , , 1966 ).
Another empirical findings is then cons ider ed: the way in which individuals look at the new pos i ti on they are ex pos ed t o. T his aspects can be anal y s ed us i ng t he r ecor d of eye movement (a pr ocedu r e used al s o i n other experiments, see f or example R umi at i , 1990). Such pr ocedur e ( t hat can s how the s ucces s i on of fixations but not what information is being pr oces s ed at each time) allows to observe t hat at each point of fixation the s ubj ect is acquiring i nf or mat i on about the l ocat i on of a piece at or near the poi nt observed, and al s o i nf or mat i on on the pi eces around t hat bearing a significant relation to t he f i x ed one.
A f i r s t general aspects should be not i ced: also t he s of t war e des i gned t o pl ay ches s by " selective search" (as the one us ed by Simon) contain pr oces s es that can be l abel l ed " per cept ual " and i t s then a possible way to model situations of this kind. Some k i nd of perception is , in fact, necessary to al l ow a s el ect i v e s ear ch. Simon and B ar enf el d s i mul at e t he i ni t i al sequence of the eye movement s of human s ubj ects using a pr ogr am cal l ed PERCEI VER.
A par t from the empirical analysis, the pr ogr am r equi r es a s er i es of other hypothesis, for example: for each of the pi eces near to t he one f i x ed, four aspects are det ect ed: (a) if they defend t he pi ece in exam, (b) if they attack it, (c) if they are def ended by it, (d) if they are attacked by it. T he or der in which thes e i t ems are not i ced i s relevant, as when a pi ece i s noticed f or one of the r eas on s een, the f i x at i on is moved on it. I t is also neces s ar y to def i ne t he s t ar t i ng poi nt of fixation (a pi ece near to t he cent r e of the boar d) 2 . 2 T he aut hor don ¡ t discuss the or i gi ns of fhese hypot hes i s and t hei r relevance on the r es ul t s . We Pictures 1b and 1 c ( i n appendi x ) , taken, from the paper under exam, show a compar i s on among the pat h of fixations of respectively an exper t real player and a s i mu l at ed ar t i f i ci al player in the game pos i t i on of picture 1 a. Six of the human s player fixations fall in unoccupied s quar es (these can be r el at ed t o pr obl ems of calibration in the anal ys i s of eye movement , or can have ot her unknown explanations ), while t he ar t i f i ci al player always look at occupied s quar es . Nevertheless, Simon and B ar enfel notices a con s i der abl e concor dance bet ween the obj ect s of attention in the two cas es (the s ame pi eces and t he s ame r el at i ons with their neighbours; these as pect s can be seen better look i ng al s o at the out put of the pr ogr am r epor ti ng i n detail the as pects analyzed, see picture 2 ) . I t should be not i ced t hat PERCEI VER s focuses of attention don t rest on par ticular evaluation of the pos s i bl e moves and devel opment of the game, but just on a s er i es of simple search r ules . At the end of the s er i es of fixations, PERCEI VER identifies the B l ack pawn as under defended. T hen it start a n ew ex pl or ati on to f i nd moves that could pr ot ect it (using t he s ame per cept ual processes as before). I n this way it discovers three pos s i bl e moves . One of this is discovered i n the same way by the human exper t used as a ben ch mar k .
T he mai n aim of this example i s to s how that a compu t er can us e per cept ual processes resembling those us ed by human s ubj ects . PERCEI VER is, in fact, able t o ex t r act from the boar d al mos t the same i nf or mat i on of a s k i lled human player . T he det ai l of the pr oces s es should y et be bes t understood al s o becaus e, there ar e i mpor t ant aspects unknown that should be hypot hes i z ed. T he program can cons equently be i mpr oved.
T here i s a s econ d as pect s that define t he human per for mance i n ches s game per cept i on: the capacity to r et ai n the i nf or mat i on gather ed and t o r epr oduce i t in the memor y. T his aspect is reproduced wi t h another program. Again, the anal ys i s starts from ex per i mental results showing t hat the ability of real players to reproduce a ch es s position after a f ew s econds ex pos ur e t o i t depends sensitively on: a) his chess proficiency and b) on the meani ngf ul nes s of the pos i t i on. T his is again a cen t r al aspect in the wor k under exam, as Simon and B ar enf el (p. 369) states that "an explanation of chess perception mus t be cons i s t ent with this data i f it is to be r egar ded as satisfactory". T he ex pl anat i on s hould al s o be cons i s t ent with the k nown char acter is tics of human s hor t and l ong term memor y. Simon s analysis of this aspects is based on the i dea of chunck 3 . Here i t is defined as "any configuration that is familiar to t he s ubj ect and can ther efor e be r ecogni z ed by him. Chunks differs among i ndi vi dual s , in the cas e of chess, according t o t hei r experience and l evel of skills. I f a conf i gur at i on of relations is recognized as familiar it can be r epr es ent ed i n memor y by a s i n gl e chunk. In this way the s hor t term memor y can r etain many more r el at i ons than if they must be held i ndependent l y . T hen exper t players can r etain in their short term memor y much infor mation, given an expos ition of the s ame t i me. Subjects can us ually held i n their short term memor y only about seven chunks (and i n s uch a s h or t term they can pr obably transfer to l ong t er m memor y only one chunk ) .
T his part of the per cept i on pr oces s is simulated us i ng a pr ogr am cal l ed EPAM, that was originally developed i n a di fferent setting, where i t was able t o mak e correct predictions on the ef f ect s of familiarity in r ote ver bal learning.
T he new compl ete pr ogr am concatenate PERCEI VER and EPAM and ai m to s i mul at e t he memor y for chess position of both a weak and a mas t er chess player (Simon and Gilmartin, 1973) . I t is composed by two mai n par ts : (1) a l ear ni n g component that stores in the l ong-term memor y a v ar y i ng amounts of information about simple r ecurring patterns of pieces on a ch ess board, proposed i n a t r ai ni n g s es s i on; (2) a per f or man ce component that: (2a) detects the pi eces on the boar d; (2b) recognizes patterns (the r ecogni t i on depend on the chunk s -i.e. on the patterns -that have pr evi ous l y been s tor ed i n the l ong t er m memor y; only these s equences can be r ecogni z ed) and s t or es them i n the s hor t term memor y (that is limited i n capacity and t han contain a max i mu m of seven names ); (2c) decodes the i nf or mat i on in the s hor t term memor y and r epr oduces as much of the or i gi nal board position as possible.
Picture 3 (in appendi x ) show the out put of the s econd par t of the pr ogr am.
T o t es t the val i di t y of the model , different nets of patterns were build by propos ing to t he pr ogr am a s er i es of usual chess positions (drawn fr om games in the published literature). T wo k i nds of net were bui l d, with differ ent dimension, standing f or different level of ability of a player (Simon and Chas e, 1973 , showed t hat chess skills depends in lar ge par t upon a v as t and organized l ong t er m memor y of chunks; see al s o S i mon, 1978). T he per f or mance of MAPP in r ecognizing patterns was then compar ed ( i n different direction and i n quantitative and qualitative t er ms ) to t hat of an exper imental sample of master and cl as s A ches s players. I t resulted agai n a qual i t at i ve r es embl ance bet ween r eal and s i mul at ed behavi our (a similar percentage of pattern r ecognis ed, the s ame pattern r ecognized mor e f r equent l y) . T he program i s then again able t o account for the mai n featur es of the human per for mance. A neocl as s i cal representation of this situation would pr obabl y have l ead t o a model to gener at e t he best moves. T his program, on the cont r ar y, try to account for real human decis ions . As seen, the s i mul at i on j us t described ar e, in fact, based on a det ai l ed r econs t r uct i on of the r eal human pr ocesses, in r elation to t he di f f er ent steps of the per cept i on mechanis m of chess board positions. T he mai n dis tinctive f eat ur es of such mechanis ms are empi r i cally individuated and extrapolated f r om the r eal i t y, using many kind of methodologies: experiments, protocol analysis, eye movement analysis …, and l ook i ng at analysis from di f fer ent domain (not only from s tudi es on chess, but also on memor y; perception in other situations …). T hese empi r i cal practices are gener ally us ed i n ps ychology. I n economics they are wi del y not seen as useful or even " s cientific" , also becaus e t he i nt er es t is generally focused, at maximum, on testing model s predictions, and not in finding r eal hypothesis on behaviour . Neoclassical Economics, in fact, don t take car e of the r eal i s m of its hypothesis. Experiments, so, should j us t reproduce t he s i mpl e t heor et i cal environment and ar e built to t es t theories. Different instruments, and di f f er ent kind of experiments and of analysis are neces s ar y, on the cont r ar y , when the i nt er es t is also di r ect ed t o under s t andi ng r eal behaviour and not only in testing model (this is a s econ d s t ep i n the empi r i cal analysis and i t requires different kind of data from the pr evi ous one) as I ha ve not ed i n Novar es e ( 2003). I n this paper I individua ted, yet, a new s tr eam of experimental research (experimental cognitive economi cs ) whose ai m i s also t hat of entering t he bl ack box of human r eas oning and t han r es embling t he empi rical methodologies recalled her e ( S i mon is , in fact, one of the mai n r efer ence of this new s tr eam) .
As seen in the pr evi ous paragraph, is obvious that this kind of modelization r equir es naturally a simulation appr oach.
Another important aspects is related t o t he gener ality of the pr opos ed modellization. Chess is taken as an example, of a mor e gener alized k i nds of situations. T he s ame el ement ar y proces ses that have been employed t o s i mul at e pr obl em s ol vi ng and learning i n ches s , operating i n es s entially the s ame way , produce t he s ame k nown featur es of the human per ceptual performances in other perceptive t as k s . T herefore, similar programs revealed able t o des cr i be per cept i on in different environment.
T his generality can be r ead i n another direction too. Recalling al s o S i mon, 1978, we can s ay that chess behaviour analysis stress the r el evance of the i nf or mat i on s tor ed i n long t er m memor y. Direct retrieval of possible act i on as a r es u l t of familiar pattern, provides a bas i s for professional performance i n many other areas. Where f ami liar situation ar e f aced 4 , we can expect more sophisticated behavi our s and l evel s of performance, than in new ar eas . We s houl d al s o ex pect that this model do not imply history-free pat h of action. On the cont r ar y learning becomes more and more r el evant . I n ches s , players differ in their skills, and t he di fference ar e r el at ed t o t hei r experience, both in term of number of board pos i t i on s een, and of their characteristics. T wo pl ayer s with the s ame training ( i n ter m of number of position faced), can per for m di fferently, if their chunks differs, because of the di f f er ent positions faced i n the pas t . So, individual knowledge of an individual is based on his own exper ience. T his idea i s coherent with a pat h dependent analysis of learning mechanism and deci s i on making ( s ee R i z z el l o, 1999).
T his model could t hen r epr es ent a gen er al reference f or other models of learning, based on simulations, to be devel oped. I n the s ame per i od, a s i mi l ar methodological appr oach (with mor e pr obl ems because of the mor e complicated s i t uat i ons faced) were pr opos ed al s o by Cyert and Mar ch, to des cr i be and model the behaviour of another economic agen t s : the f i r m 5 .
1.C.I I . T he s i mul at i on of oligopolistic f i r m ' s behaviour
T he anal ys i s proposed by Cyert and Mar ch (1964) represent a bi g effort to build a r ealistic t h eor y of the f i r m, empirically founded and goi ng beyond t he t r adi t i onal economic v i s i on (when the analysis was realized, the mai n theor y of the f i r m was that proposed by the gener al equilibrium model; the t heor y of transaction cos t was still not well know and s t udi ed) .
methodology of the empi r i cal analysis
T he f i r s t part of the cont r i but i on in exam i s , in fact, again bas ed on an empir ical analysis realized on the f i el d, look i ng at several real organizations behaviour. T he f i r m s tudi ed oper at e i n oligopolistic mar k et s .
T he empi r i cal effort is based on the anal ys i s of a) different kind of internal documentations (receipts, letters, memoranda …) , b) interviews with the member s of the f i r ms , c) direct observations of decision making pr ocesses (a member of the r es ear ch gr oup par t i ci pat ed to t he mai n meet i ng of some of the f i r ms , eventually verbalizing i t ) . T wo ex per i ment s on or ganizational communi cat i on complete t he empi r i cal evidence avai l abl e. For example the aut hor s describe f our problems of decision, in which expectations , available information and t hei r interpretation play a cr uci al role.
main empir ical results
T hese l as t aspects are cent r al , because f i r m s decisions rely on es timations of alternatives costs and payof f s , and on a v i s i on of the wor l d t hat are gener al l y partial and di f f er ent from t he r eal i t y , also becaus e onl y a s u bs et of the pos s i bl e available choi ces is generally taken into account . 4 As pointed by Egidi, 2002, it ¡ s also pos s i bl e t hat some pattern of action can be ex t ended t o new s i tuati ons , showing s ome el ement s of similarity with thos e i n which a gi v en s tr ategy has been lear ned. 5 Similar appr oach can be found i n other of the applications developed i n that period and s ur veyed i n many of the paper recalled.
Firm s organization and char act er i s t i c i n f l u en ce bot h perception and ex pl or at i on of the al t er nat i ves . T here ar e, besides, always conflict of interests among t he di f f er ent internal sub-groups. T here i s also a s t r ong i ner t i a i n the deci s i on pr oces s es (alternative mor e s i milar to t hos e t ak en in the near past have an higher chance of being accept ed) . I t s also r el evant the or der in which the di f f er ent possibilities are f ound and t hen evaluated. I f alternatives are gener at ed s equent i ally, the f i r s t that allow a s at i s f i ci n g payof f is, in fact, chosen.
a gen er al model of firm behavi our and s ome applications
T his general findings are us ed t o pr opos e a gen er al theory of the deci s i ons making i nt o a compl ex organization.
T he gener al models is not formalized. I t s based on a s er i es of general ideas. T he aut hor s develop in detail some s peci f i c f or malized model s , as simplified ex ampl es of the possible applications of the gener al ideas. All these appl i cat i ons are r ealized us i ng comput er simulations, that for the aut hor s represent the nat ur al theoretical language t o model this theory. Even if the ex ampl es proposed ar e s i mplified i n r es pect to t he gener al model, in fact, simulations (and f l ow char ts ) are t he onl y way to manage s uch complexity. T he mai n pr oblems related t o s i mul at i ons are al s o pr es ent ed and di s cus s ed dur i ng t he presentation of the ex ampl es . T he book has also t wo met hodol ogi cal appendi x , on s imulations and on explanation and f or ecas t in economics . We ll recall them i n the nex t paragraph.
I n s ynthes is the model proposed as examples are t he f ollowing.
1) T he f i r s t one i s a particular model of duopoly, in which an ex-monopolist faces a " n ew fi r m" . T he mai n decis ion is related t o t he l evel of the pr oduct i on.
An impor tant feature of all these model s , is that firms have a goal that represent both the variable(s) to t ake car e ( t he var i abl e t o max i mi z e i n the neocl as s i cal model) and a cr i t er i a t o t ak e the mai n decis ion (the l evel that the var i abl e s houl d r each, i.e. a l ev el of aspiration). T he goal is here t he pr of i t . T he deci s i on ar e bas ed on an es timation of the mar k et price. T he r eal price can be di f f er ent from the es t i mat ed one.
For both agents , the pr oces s start with a f or ecas t of demand, costs, and of the r eact i on of the other firm and wi t h the def i ni t i on of the des i r ed pr of i t (based on a mean of the pas t profits; the ex-monopolist compute t he mean on a l on ger number of years; the new fi r ms take al s o i n exam i ts relative pr oduct i ve capaci t y) . I n the s econd phas e, given the r es ul t s of the pr evi ous step, each actor s look for the bes t available choice. I f such alter native don t allow to r each the des i r ed pr of i t , there i s a n ew s tep i n which the function of costs (according t o t he empi r i cal analysis performed, Cyert and Mar ch think that, because of the " i ner t i a" of each or ganization, there ar e al way s costs that can be r educed, given appr opr i at e condi t i ons forcing t o do t hat ; this process or re-examination s timulate t he f i r m to reduce i t s cost; in the model under exam, costs are r educe of a 10% p e rc e nta g e ) and demand ar e estimated agai n.
Picture 4 (in appendi x ) proposes a compar i s on between the mar k et s shares of the t wo f i r ms in the model and t hat of two r eal firms, in a du opol y s imilar to t hat under exam (the t wo f i r ms are: the American Can Company and t he new entr ant is the Cont i nent al Can Company).
T his comparison is not suppos ed t o pr ove f or itself the validity of the model , even if the f i t is very good. Accor di n g t o t he aut hor s , in fact, the model proves that given a s er i es of conditions, it is possible t o f i t the r eal data. T he pr obl ems is related t o s uch as s umptions. As in the model there are many degree of freedom ( many parameters ), it possible t hat a s et of its series could be abl e t o fit the r eal data. Even if in this particular case, such par ameter s are f ew, and mos t of them wer e defined a pr i or i , the di fficulty remains. T his is one of the mai n pr oblem r el ated t o s i mul at i ons , on which Cyer t and Mar ch ins is t in the book and on which we ll come back later.
2) Another example i s that of a department of a di s cou n t . I n this case t he oligopolistic mar k et is composed by the t hr ee di s count s of a ci t y . According t o t he aut hor s the model could be ex t ended, with few di fferences, to t he ot her departments of the s ame f i r m or to ot her discounts, as the deci s i on pr oces s es are ver y similar.
T he gener al goal of this organization are r el at ed t o t he s al es and t o t he mar k -up on the cos t s . T hese deci s i ons are t ak en accor dingly to a gener al model (again bas ed on empir ical observations of the r eal functioning of the depar t ment under exam), based on four principles: a) the f i r m i s seen as a coal i t i on of individuals characterized by different personal goals; the conflict that born fr om thi s situation is solved ( or at least the s ol ut i on is searched, even if not necessarily successfully) thanks to: (i) the us e of a " l ocal rationality" (division of the pr obl ems in sub-problems assigned t o s ub-units for the s ol ut i ons , and t hen s pecialization in the deci s i ons : for example s al es department is the mai n r es pons ible f or sales, the pr oduct i on depar tment is the mai n responsible f or production …); (i i) the f act that the coher ence of the r ul es is weak (so al l owi ng t o keep t oget her different goals); (iii) a s equent i al attention at the pr obl ems (with the cons equent possibility of different an not coherent solutions in different moments); b) firms try to avoid, uncertainty, using r ul es of reaction in the s hor t period and mak i ng t he environment more k nown thr ough negotiation (s tandar d pr ocedur es , industrial traditions …); c) "problematic r es ear ch " : the s ear ch of new s ol uti ons is driven by the pr obl ems faced (a mechanism of search differ ent from mor e s ys t emat i c k i n ds ones, as the s ear ch aimed t o understand: technical appr oach vs . science). T hen s ear ch is oriented by one pr obl em, and motivated by that problem. I t s also di s t or t ed by the char act er i s t i cs of the organization; d) organization lear ns and t hen evolves , modifying i t s goals and i t s rules.
Picture 5 (in appendi x ) proposes a r epr es en t at i on of the gener al functioning of this procedures, using a f l ow char t. T his general model is specified ( and par t l y s implified) for the depar t ment under exam.
Where pos s i bl e, the pr evi s i ons of this model are compar ed t o t he r eal i t y. T he dat a av ailable ( i . e. the dat a gat h er ed by the f i r m) doesn t allow to t es t all parts of the model . T here ar e good dat a on the pr i ces and on the mar k -up. Using as input the dat a on r eal costs and on the cl as s i f i cat i ons of each goods , the pr ogr am pr oduces as output a pr i ce f or each items . T hese prices can be compar ed t o t he r eal ones decided by the depar t ment . I n the 95% o f the cas es , the model gives a per f ect prevision. T he model has a good capaci t y to f or ecas t also t he l i qui dat i on prices of some i t ems and t he s peci al offers (it is designed t o i ndi vi duat e when a liquidation pr ice or a s peci al promotion will be pr opos ed)
3) T he l as t example pr oposed i s a general model on pr ice and pr oduct i on for oligopolistic f i r ms. T he pr ogr am r epr es ents , for the aut hor a f i r s t attempt, to build a gen er al model and s houl d be further developed.
I n r es pect to t he t r adi t i onal models is yet much mor e complicated, as it takes into accou n t several aspects.
T he choi ces that a f i r m s houl d t ak e ar e: the pr i ce, the l evel of production and t he mar k et i ng strategy. Each of them can be r el at ed t o a s u b-division of the f i r m, that operate wi t h a r el at i v e independence f r om t he ot her departments.
An (agent based) model of the oligopoly market results from the i nt er act i on of many firms , represented by a s i mi l ar model but with differ ent starting condi t i ons and par amet er s . Firms interact both tr ough mar ket price and demand, and with a r eci pr ocal attention when a pr i ce should be def i ned. T he model generates a det ai l ed s er i es of decisions, related t o t he i nt er nal results and ai ms , for each of the f i r ms and a mar k et price and quant i t y .
T he anal ys i s of this general model is just a f i rst step, and al l ows authors to di s cus s an impor tant question: the r el evance of the par amet er s on the gener al results of a s i mu l at i on . T hey try to i ndi vi duat e t he par amet er s that have a s i gni f i can t influence on the out put . T his analysis is based on a r egr ession of the mai n output variable of the model on a s el ect i on of parameters. Some of them, show i n fact, a s t r on g i nf l uence, while ot her s seems to be l es s relevant. As the aut hor s say, this problems is related t o t he l ack of empirical observations on s ome aspects (when the r es ear ch on the f i el d s t ar t ed, the model and t he par amet er s were, obviously, still to be planned, and s o not all the empi r i cal aspects relevant for it were gat her ed; besides, there ar e aspects that cannot be s een) . T o s ol ve t hi s problem, some of the par amet er s should pr obabl y be model l ed and get as results of learning mechani s m of higher level.
S imulat ions and t he met hodol ogy of Economics
As seen in the ex ampl es , simulations are i nt r oduced by the aut hor s under exam, as a n eces s ar y tool for managing compl ex models, based on r ealis tic h y pot h es i s founded on empir ical findings of different types. T he need f or realism i s a cen t r al point in the met hodol ogi cal program of this school , from whi ch the ot her aspects follow i n a r el at ed way and i t is seen as a n eces s ar y condition to al l ow a better comprehension of the r eal i t y , and maybe al s o a better prevision, thanks to t he f act that more compl i cat ed model s can be per f or med us i ng comput er s . T he complication in models is strongly related t o t he s ear ch for more r eal i s m ( Cohen 1960b ).
Unrealistic h y pot h es i s are, yet, not refused a pr i or i (also i n the model s seen her e t her e ar e many aspects not empirically tested) but cannot be accept ed i f they are pr oved t o be f al s e and i f a mor e realistic on e can be f ound ( and s houl d be f ound) , independently from the per f or mance of the model. Even tr aditional models are not refused f or itself. Computer programs allow to ex pr es s theories in a n ew di fferent mathematical languages and al l ow then new pos s i bilities that can be added t o t he other available l anguages (verbal language, graphics and mat hs ) . When pos s ible, simulations should be per f or med i n par allel to t r adi t i onal mathematical models, has both of them has limits and advant ages . Simulations are l es s general, as they need mor e i nf or mat i on than tr aditional models and t hei r results are a s er i es of number. T hat s not necessary a l i mi t , it s just a di fferent characteristics, that has many positive i mpl i cat i ons . I n fact, for example, these s er i es of number make i t possible t o t es t immediately the t heor y more easily than tr aditional models. T hat s particularly important because us i ng s i mul at i ons it is possible, not only to handl e ver y complex situations, but also t o build t heor y that are i nt r i ns i cal l y dynamic, and not only based on one per i od movement s . As real data ar e dy nami cs , in this way it s easier to compar e t heor y and r eality (but again, empirical verification is not so r el evant for some of the t r adi t i onal economist).
Cohen 1960 proposes other positive el ement s related t o s i mul at i ons . -I n r es pect to aggr egat e economi c model ling ( Cohen 1960b ), a mi cr o appr oach have many advantages. Markets, for example, become emer gent phenomena, arising f r om t he i nt er act i on of a series of firm ( whos e het er ogenei t y can als o be model l ed, while t hi s characteristic i s more di f f i cul t to be account ed f or it in tr aditional micro model s and i t s excluded i n aggr egat e t heor i z at i on 6 ). I t s possible t hat factors that differ among agent s and t hat are ex cl uded by aggr egat e model s (or that are not explainable by them) could compens at e each other in aggr egat e s et . But that s not necessary, as this individual effects can als o have a s t r on g ef f ect on the gener al result. A mi cr o modelization is then a better way to pr oceed. Even fir ms can be modelled as emerging f r om the i ndi vi dual characteristics of their members (see Novarese 2003, where t he r el evance of this aspects is empirically analysed). Cyert and Mar ch (1964) include, more or less directly, this aspects in their models, taking i nt o account the conflict of interests and t he r ol e pl ayed by the di fferent departments in a or gan i z at i on . I n s imulations , heterogeneity can be r el at ed t o s ome di f f er ences posed by the r es ear ches but can also r es ul t s from di f fer ent learning pr oces s es , given the s ame gener al model (as, for example, in Simon analys is of different chess players, that differs in r elation to t he l engt h of the t r ai ni ng and can differ also i n r elation to t he pos i t i ons faced).
-T he as s umpt i ons are eas y to modi f y and change t han in tr aditional analysis 7 .
T his new methodol ogy reflect themselves also i n the r el at i on with Econometr ics that is not refused by a s i mu l at i on appr oach. T here i s on the cont r ar y a n eed t o i nt er act . T he new appr oach, besides, poses new pr obl ems and r equi r ement s (proposed by Choen 1960b as another critical factor for the development of simulations; Cohen and Mar ch 1964 recall them and gi ve s ome pr el i mi nar y ideas of the pos s i bl e di r ect i on in which find a s ol u t i on ) , as econometrics developed i n s tr ict relation with traditional one-period model s T he novel t y of the appr oach under exam and i t s attention to empi r i cal analysis is reflected al s o i n the var i et y of empirical data an d anal ys i s used. Consider the f ol l owi ng ex ampl es . -Simon and Chas e, 1973 , propose an exper iment with a det ailed anal ys i s of the behavi our of just three ches s players. T heir aim i s that of understanding how they play, not to t es t a model . Experimental economics is generally us ed t o t es t theory and t her e i s generally no attention in understanding why players behave i n that given way (see Novar es e 2003). -Cyert and Mar ch pr opos es a s er i es of case s t udi es , as a way to under s t and how fi r m takes decisions. 6 B ut that has the di s advant age t o i ncr eas e t he cos t s of the anal ys i s , as it make necessary also a wi der study to i ndi vi duat e all possible k i nds of agents and t o model them 7 Simulations allows to wor k with for mal models also t o non mathematical economists. T hey should, yet, be able t o manage comput er simulations. I n the l as t years more and mor e economi cs courses are s t ar t i ng t o include s uch s kill, but in the 6 0 s it was probably not so, and t hi s can be anot her factors able t o ex pl ai n the low i nter es t in this approach. T he s ui t ability of easy programmi ng l anguage wer e pos ed by the s ame Cohen as one of the cr uci al factors for the devel opment of this appr oach. I t ¡ s possible t hat the devel opment of object oriented pr ogr ammati on helped t o i ncr eas e t he r ol e of simulations in economics (Prietula et al, 1978) . Clarkson and S i mon (1960) and S i mon (2000) pose al s o t he attention on the r el evance of the devel opment of "heuristic pr ogr ammat i on " allowing t o s i mul ate s ys t em that manage non numer ical values. 8 I t ¡ s not possible t o anal ys e her e t hi s aspect, that are j us t mentioned i n the s t udi es under exam. I n s hor t, the pr obl ems recalled ar e r el at ed t o: -criteria t o pos t ul ate and es t i mat e mor e complicate f unct i onal forms have t o be devel oped, -the es t i mat i ons of the par amet er s (to be done bef or e t he s i mul at i on is run and r epr es ent i ng one of the possible way to s ol ve t he pr obl em s een) poses other problems as most of them can be gener at ed by simultaneous equations of a model ; -it is necessary to devi s e t es t allowing t o def i ne t he goodness of fit of simulated and r eal data ( cons i der i n g also t hat real data can have meas ur e pr obl ems ) Case s t udi es are anot her tool that economics tend t o avoi d, for many reas ons. T here i s still no methodological agreement on how to conduct them and pr es ent their data 9 . T he mai n pr oblems are r el at ed t o t he way decisions are anal y z ed. T he r es ear cher can, also uncons ci ous l y, be influenced by his persona i deas and i nt er es t in gather ing i nf or mat i on. His presence can influence the behavi our of the s ubj ect s under exam. T here i s also an obvious problem of generality of the results found 10 . Simon (1992, p. 20 ) has yet an ans wer to s uch cr iticis m: "If you ar e t r yi ng t o under s t and what firms are and how they operate, you will learn a l ot from thi s kind of very detailed s t udy of the processes of decision … Of course, we s houl d not stop wi t h five f i r ms . Biologists have des cr i bed millions of species of plants and ani mal s in the wor l d, and t hey think they ve har dl y started t he job. Now, I m not sugges t i ng t hat we s houl d go out and des cr i be deci s i on making i n a mi llion fir m; but we mi ght at least get on with the t as k and s ee i f we can des cr ibe t he f i r s t thousand. T hat doesn t immedi atel y solve t he aggr egat i on pr oblem, but surely, and in s pite of the ques t i on of sampling, it is better to f or m an aggr egat e f r om detai l ed empi r i cal knowledge of a t h ou s an d f i r ms , or five, than fr om di r ect knowledge of none. But the l atter is what we have been doing i n economics for too many years " .
T he aut hors in exam don t discuss in detail this specific pr obl ems of the empi r i cal analysis (probably als o becaus e at that time t her e wer e a di fferent status among economi s t for the empirical research; for example t he cont empor ar y, more r i gor ous , way to pr es ent experimental results developed l at er , see Novar es e and R i z z el l o 1999) but stress the need of getting better data and obs er vat i ons on r eal behaviour. as a con di t i on for the devel opment of simulation techniques and of the mor e gener al (behavioural) economic methodology. March and Gr unber g ( i n Cyer t and Mar ch, 1964, p 366) put the empi r i cal analysis as the s t ar t i ng point of their methodology. T hey think, in fact, that economics should be s een as part of the s t udy of human behaviour and t han it need t r ue empi r i cal hypothesis that can be us ed i n all contests and model s . Cohen 1960a s t at es that simulations are es peci ally adapted t o t he devel opment of a beh av i ou r al models of the f i r m at a mi cr o economi c l ev el . T his statement can be ex t ended t o t he gener al behavioural micro-modelization. T o t ak e f ull advantage of simulations, it is then neces s ar y to obt ai n a gr eat body of empirical materials 11 (Cohen 1960a) . Computer programs can r epr es ent a f r amewor k around whi ch or ganize the col l ect i on of data. T his is a pos i t i v e el ements, but again als o a pos s i bl e bound, as to devel op a behav i ou r al appr oach, a l ot of data ar e neces s ar y and t hey should be ver y detailed and s o compl i cat ed and cos t l y to collect (this can be anot her factors able t o ex pl ai n the l ow s ucces s of this appr oach) 12 .
T his views of the economi c r equ i r es , obviously, a di al ogu e wi t h other disciplines (psychology firs t of all).
Conclusion
T his paper proposed an analys is of the met hodol ogi cal appr oach to economi cs developed and proposed by a s er i es of authors in the s i x t i es . T his appr oach can be def i ned cogni t i ve and 9 Also becaus e of privacy problems of the f i r ms under exam. 10 T he f i t ness of the s peci f i c model proposed by Cyert and Mar ch can be al s o at t r i but ed t o i t s peculiarity and lack of generality. 11 Simulations requires also a det ailed anal y s i s of working pr i nci pl es and i ns t i t ut i ons (in that there i s a parallel with exper imental economics). 12 T he cos t s comprises also t he " ment al " difficulties of a mor e i nt er di s ci plinary approach by the economi s t that should be, in fact, less specialized t o per f or m i t (in the r ecalled paper s , empirical analysis, theoretical modelization and comput er programs were all present together), losing t he advant age of division of the labour.
behavioural, because of the at t ent i on to r eal perception and deci s i on making and t o t he r ol e assigned t o l ear ni ng pr oces s es .
One of the mai n point of departure i s constituted by the wi s h to r el ay on more r eal i s t i c assumptions, as a con di t i on for better a u n der s t an di n g and f or ecas t of the r eal i t y. T his idea l ead t o the need of more dat a an d of different empirical methodologies (see al s o S i mon 2000). Simulations are s een as the mos t important, even if not unique, way to model i s e t he r es ul t i ng complexity. T he paper s discussed i ndi vi duat e a s er i es of problems and need, that are r el at ed t o t he k i nd of general appr oach pur s ued, but that have, in s ome cas es , also a mor e gener al validity and s eems then us eful for the cont empor aneous l y debate on s imulations (that is not necessarily linked t o a behavioural appr oach and bas ed on r ealis tic as s u mpt i on s ) , as many of the pr obl ems seems to be again pr es ent, as testified by T estfatsion 2002.
